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One Sentence Summary: We propose to change the default P-value threshold for statistical 
significance for claims of new discoveries from 0.05 to 0.005. 
 
Main Text:  
The lack of reproducibility of scientific studies has caused growing concern over the 
credibility of claims of new discoveries based on “statistically significant” findings. There has 
been much progress toward documenting and addressing several causes of this lack of 
reproducibility (e.g., multiple testing, P-hacking, publication bias, and under-powered studies). 
However, we believe that a leading cause of non-reproducibility has not yet been adequately 
addressed: Statistical standards of evidence for claiming new discoveries in many fields of 
science are simply too low. Associating “statistically significant” findings with P < 0.05 results 
in a high rate of false positives even in the absence of other experimental, procedural and 
reporting problems. 
For fields where the threshold for defining statistical significance for new discoveries 
is 𝑃 < 0.05, we propose a change to 𝑃 < 0.005. This simple step would immediately improve 
the reproducibility of scientific research in many fields. Results that would currently be called 
“significant” but do not meet the new threshold should instead be called “suggestive.” While 
statisticians have known the relative weakness of using 𝑃 ≈ 0.05 as a threshold for discovery 
and the proposal to lower it to 0.005 is not new (1, 2), a critical mass of researchers now endorse 
this change. 
We restrict our recommendation to claims of discovery of new effects. We do not address 
the appropriate threshold for confirmatory or contradictory replications of existing claims. We 
also do not advocate changes to discovery thresholds in fields that have already adopted more 
stringent standards (e.g., genomics and high-energy physics research; see Potential Objections 
below). 
We also restrict our recommendation to studies that conduct null hypothesis significance 
tests. We have diverse views about how best to improve reproducibility, and many of us believe 
that other ways of summarizing the data, such as Bayes factors or other posterior summaries 
based on clearly articulated model assumptions, are preferable to P-values. However, changing 
the P-value threshold is simple, aligns with the training undertaken by many researchers, and 
might quickly achieve broad acceptance.    
 
 Strength of evidence from P-values 
 In testing a point null hypothesis 𝐻0 against an alternative hypothesis 𝐻1 based on data 
𝑥obs, the P-value is defined as the probability, calculated under the null hypothesis, that a test 
statistic is as extreme or more extreme than its observed value. The null hypothesis is typically 
rejected—and the finding is declared “statistically significant”—if the P-value falls below the 
(current) Type I error threshold α = 0.05. 
 From a Bayesian perspective, a more direct measure of the strength of evidence for 𝐻1 
relative to 𝐻0 is the ratio of their probabilities. By Bayes’ rule, this ratio may be written as: 
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 Pr(𝐻1|𝑥obs)
Pr(𝐻0|𝑥obs)
=
𝑓(𝑥obs|𝐻1)
𝑓(𝑥obs|𝐻0)
×
Pr(𝐻1)
Pr(𝐻0)
≡ 𝐵𝐹 ×  (prior odds), (1) 
 
where 𝐵𝐹 is the Bayes factor that represents the evidence from the data, and the prior odds can 
be informed by researchers’ beliefs, scientific consensus, and validated evidence from similar 
research questions in the same field. Multiple hypothesis testing, P-hacking, and publication bias 
all reduce the credibility of evidence. Some of these practices reduce the prior odds of 𝐻1 relative 
to 𝐻0 by changing the population of hypothesis tests that are reported. Prediction markets (3) and 
analyses of replication results (4) both suggest that for psychology experiments, the prior odds of 
𝐻1 relative to 𝐻0 may be only about 1:10. A similar number has been suggested in cancer clinical 
trials, and the number is likely to be much lower in preclinical biomedical research (5).  
There is no unique mapping between the P-value and the Bayes factor since the Bayes 
factor depends on 𝐻1. However, the connection between the two quantities can be evaluated for 
particular test statistics under certain classes of plausible alternatives (Fig. 1). 
 
[Figure 1 here] 
 
A two-sided P-value of 0.05 corresponds to Bayes factors in favor of 𝐻1 that range from about 
2.5 to 3.4 under reasonable assumptions about 𝐻1 (Fig. 1). This is weak evidence from at least 
three perspectives. First, conventional Bayes factor categorizations (6) characterize this range as 
“weak” or “very weak.” Second, we suspect many scientists would guess that 𝑃 ≈ 0.05 implies 
stronger support for 𝐻1 than a Bayes factor of 2.5 to 3.4. Third, using equation (1) and prior odds 
of 1:10, a P-value of 0.05 corresponds to at least 3:1 odds (i.e., the reciprocal of the product 
1
10
×  3.4) in favor of the null hypothesis! 
 
Why 0.005? 
 The choice of any particular threshold is arbitrary and involves a trade-off between Type 
I and II errors. We propose 0.005 for two reasons. First, a two-sided P-value of 0.005 
corresponds to Bayes factors between approximately 14 and 26 in favor of 𝐻1. This range 
represents “substantial” to “strong” evidence according to conventional Bayes factor 
classifications (6). 
 Second, in many fields the 𝑃 < 0.005 standard would reduce the false positive rate to 
levels we judge to be reasonable. If we let 𝜙 denote the proportion of null hypotheses that are 
true, (1 − 𝛽) the power of tests in rejecting false null hypotheses, and 𝛼 the Type I 
error/significance threshold, then as the population of tested hypotheses becomes large, the false 
positive rate (i.e., the proportion of true null effects among the total number of statistically 
significant findings) can be approximated by  
 
 
false positive rate ≈  
𝛼𝜙
𝛼𝜙 + (1 − 𝛽)(1 − 𝜙)
. (2) 
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For different levels of the prior odds that there is a true effect, 
1−𝜙
𝜙
, and for significance 
thresholds 𝛼 = 0.05 and 𝛼 = 0.005, Figure 2 shows the false positive rate as a function of 
power 1 − 𝛽. 
 
[Figure 2 here] 
 
In many studies, statistical power is low (e.g., ref. 7). Fig. 2 demonstrates that low statistical 
power and 𝛼 = 0.05 combine to produce high false positive rates. 
 For many, the calculations illustrated by Fig. 2 may be unsettling. For example, the false 
positive rate is greater than 33% with prior odds of 1:10 and a P-value threshold of 0.05, 
regardless of the level of statistical power. Reducing the threshold to 0.005 would reduce this 
minimum false positive rate to 5%. Similar reductions in false positive rates would occur over a 
wide range of statistical powers. 
Empirical evidence from recent replication projects in psychology and experimental 
economics provide insights into the prior odds in favor of 𝐻1. In both projects, the rate of 
replication (i.e., significance at P < 0.05 in the replication in a consistent direction) was roughly 
double for initial studies with P < 0.005 relative to initial studies with 0.005 < P < 0.05: 50% 
versus 24% for psychology (8), and 85% versus 44% for experimental economics (9). Although 
based on relatively small samples of studies (93 in psychology, 16 in experimental economics, 
after excluding initial studies with P > 0.05), these numbers are suggestive of the potential gains 
in reproducibility that would accrue from the new threshold of P < 0.005 in these fields. In 
biomedical research, 96% of a sample of recent papers claim statistically significant results with 
the P < 0.05 threshold (10). However, replication rates were very low (5)  for these studies, 
suggesting a potential for gains by adopting this new standard in these fields as well. 
 
Potential Objections 
 We now address the most compelling arguments against adopting this higher standard of 
evidence. 
  The false negative rate would become unacceptably high. Evidence that does not reach 
the new significance threshold should be treated as suggestive, and where possible  further 
evidence should be accumulated; indeed, the combined results from several studies may be 
compelling even if any particular study is not. Failing to reject the null hypothesis does not mean 
accepting the null hypothesis. Moreover, the false negative rate will not increase if sample sizes 
are increased so that statistical power is held constant.   
For a wide range of common statistical tests, transitioning from a P-value threshold of 
𝛼 = 0.05 to 𝛼 = 0.005 while maintaining 80% power would require an increase in sample sizes 
of about 70%. Such an increase means that fewer studies can be conducted using current 
experimental designs and budgets. But Figure 2 shows the benefit: false positive rates would 
typically fall by factors greater than two. Hence, considerable resources would be saved by not 
performing future studies based on false premises. Increasing sample sizes is also desirable 
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because studies with small sample sizes tend to yield inflated effect size estimates (11), and 
publication and other biases may be more likely in an environment of small studies (12). We 
believe that efficiency gains would far outweigh losses. 
The proposal does not address multiple hypothesis testing, P-hacking, publication bias, 
low power, or other biases (e.g., confounding, selective reporting, measurement error), which 
are arguably the bigger problems. We agree. Reducing the P-value threshold complements—but 
does not substitute for—solutions to these other problems, which include good study design, ex 
ante power calculations, pre-registration of planned analyses, replications, and transparent 
reporting of procedures and all statistical analyses conducted.  
The appropriate threshold for statistical significance should be different for different 
research communities. We agree that the significance threshold selected for claiming a new 
discovery should depend on the prior odds that the null hypothesis is true, the number of 
hypotheses tested, the study design, the relative cost of Type I versus Type II errors, and other 
factors that vary by research topic. For exploratory research with very low prior odds (well 
outside the range in Figure 2), even lower significance thresholds than 0.005 are needed. 
Recognition of this issue led the genetics research community to move to a “genome-wide 
significance threshold” of 5×10-8 over a decade ago. And in high-energy physics, the tradition 
has long been to define significance by a “5-sigma” rule (roughly a P-value threshold of 3×10-7). 
We are essentially suggesting a move from a 2-sigma rule to a 3-sigma rule. 
 Our recommendation applies to disciplines with prior odds broadly in the range depicted 
in Figure 2, where use of P < 0.05 as a default is widespread. Within those disciplines, it is 
helpful for consumers of research to have a consistent benchmark. We feel the default should be 
shifted. 
Changing the significance threshold is a distraction from the real solution, which is to 
replace null hypothesis significance testing (and bright-line thresholds) with more focus on effect 
sizes and confidence intervals, treating the P-value as a continuous measure, and/or a Bayesian 
method. Many of us agree that there are better approaches to statistical analyses than null 
hypothesis significance testing, but as yet there is no consensus regarding the appropriate choice 
of replacement.  For example, a recent statement by the American Statistical Association 
addressed numerous issues regarding the misinterpretation and misuse of P-values (as well as the 
related concept of statistical significance), but failed to make explicit policy recommendations to 
address these shortcomings (13). Even after the significance threshold is changed, many of us 
will continue to advocate for alternatives to null hypothesis significance testing.   
 
Concluding remarks 
Ronald Fisher understood that the choice of 0.05 was arbitrary when he introduced it 
(14).  Since then, theory and empirical evidence have demonstrated that a lower threshold is 
needed. A much larger pool of scientists are now asking a much larger number of questions, 
possibly with much lower prior odds of success.   
For research communities that continue to rely on null hypothesis significance testing, 
reducing the P-value threshold for claims of new discoveries to 0.005 is an actionable step that 
will immediately improve reproducibility.  We emphasize that this proposal is about standards of 
evidence, not standards for policy action nor standards for publication.  Results that do not reach 
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the threshold for statistical significance (whatever it is) can still be important and merit 
publication in leading journals if they address important research questions with rigorous 
methods. This proposal should not be used to reject publications of novel findings with 0.005 
< P < 0.05 properly labeled as suggestive evidence. We should reward quality and transparency 
of research as we impose these more stringent standards, and we should monitor how 
researchers’ behaviors are affected by this change. Otherwise, science runs the risk that the more 
demanding threshold for statistical significance will be met to the detriment of quality and 
transparency. 
 Journals can help transition to the new statistical significance threshold. Authors and 
readers can themselves take the initiative by describing and interpreting results more 
appropriately in light of the new proposed definition of “statistical significance.” The new 
significance threshold will help researchers and readers to understand and communicate evidence 
more accurately. 
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